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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY A PROPER SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The trial court improperly ruled Mr. Pearce was required to produce undisputed 
evidence of gross negligence to avoid summary judgment. The Sports Park argues the trial 
court's opinion should not be read literally because the standard for summary judgment is 
well known. See Brief of Appellee at 36-37. Mr. Pearce does not agree the actual language 
and reasoning of judicial opinions can be disregarded in favor of only a desired outcome. 
The trial court set forth this standard: "[t]here must be undisputed facts in evidence 
relating to each element of the claim before a party may prevail." (Appx. 10) The court 
continued, "the court cannot state there are undisputed facts that would show [Mr. Pearce] 
is entitled to relief under a theory of gross negligence." Id. In the face of the court's plain 
statements, it is nothing more than wishful thinking to assume the trial court then disregarded 
its own stated standard and proceeded to properly review the evidence. Rather, the trial court 
constructed its opinion on a faulty foundation. The result was predictably flawed and must 
be reversed. 
IL THE SPORTS PARK'S EVIDENCE OF THE EXERCISE OF SOME 
DEGREE OF CARE DOES NOT PRECLUDE A FINDING OF GROSS 
NEGLIGENCE 
Mr. Pearce's claim of Gross Negligence is not precluded by a showing of some care 
on the part of the Sports Park. The Park argues the trial court properly assessed gross 
negligence "in light of the undisputed facts regarding UAF's actions." See Brief of Appellee 
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at 37. In other words, the trial court properly ignored Mr. Pearce's evidence, and the 
inferences therefrom, and based its ruling solely on the undisputed evidence of some care 
produced by the Sports Park. 
The Sports Park asserts it cannot be grossly negligent because it exercised some level 
of care by designing the track to Olympic standards, having an orientation, and warning 
passengers about an aggressive ride. See Brief of Appellee at 39. Under this construct, no 
matter how many duties were subsequently breached, and no matter how negligent the 
conduct, gross negligence would always be precluded by the showing of some amount of 
care. 
However, the Sports Park's undisputed evidence of the care it took in operating the 
bobsled ride does not preclude Mr. Pearce' s evidence of its concurrent gross negligence. For 
example, a driver may produce undisputed evidence he had a valid drivers license, new tires 
and brakes, no previous accidents, had both hands on the wheel, and was watching the road 
in front of him. This would not preclude a jury from finding the same driver grossly 
negligent for driving 100 mph through a school zone while drunk. While there is certainly 
evidence the driver exhibited some care for others' safety, it does not follow this care 
precludes a finding of gross negligence. 
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S. W.2d 917 (Tex. 1998), the heirs of Mr. Ellender 
recovered against Mobil for its gross negligence in exposing Mr. Ellender to benzene for 
thirty years without any warning or protection. Mobil sought to overturn a jury's finding of 
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gross negligence stating it complied with the industrial standards for benzene and took some 
steps to protect workers from exposure. The Court ruled, "the fact that a defendant exercises 
some care does not insulate the defendant from gross negligence liability." Id. at 923-24.x 
Here, it is undisputed the Park inherited a bobsled track designed and tested to 
Olympic standards. Yet, it is also undisputed the Park opened the track to the general public 
without any testing, research or analysis of the effects and dangers of such a ride, or its 
modified sled, on members of the general public as opposed to Olympic athletes. (TR 95, 
97) A jury could find this conduct indicates recklessness or even a conscious disregard of 
the dangers posed by the rigors of the bobsled run on the general public. 
It is undisputed the Sports Park had an orientation. Yet, it is also undisputed the Park 
did not inform patrons the fourth seat was significantly more dangerous than the second and 
third positions. (TR 132) It is undisputed patrons were improperly seated in the fourth seat 
which further increased their risk of serious injury. (TR 131) It is undisputed patrons were 
not told of the substantial risk of spinal injury from riding the bobsled. (TR 133) Jay Gordon 
opined the Park's injury statistics demonstrated "an extreme disregard for their patron's 
health and safety." (Appx. 31) A jury could find the Park grossly negligent in not using this 
orientation to inform the public in general, and fourth seat riders in particular, of the 
statistically overwhelming risk of spinal injury. 
1
 Though not binding on this Court, it should be noted Judge Stewart of the Utah federal 
district court recently ruled the showing of even slight care on the part of the defendant precluded 
a finding of gross negligence. Milne v. USA Cycling, Inc., — F.Supp.2d —-; 2007 WL 
1698277. For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Pearce disagrees with Judge Stewart's ruling. 
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It is undisputed the Sports Park warned riders of an aggressive ride. Yet, the Park 
could still be grossly negligent because it had no idea how the ride's "aggressiveness" 
affected patrons, what health risks were involved, or how the Park's own self-imposed 
ignorance increased these risks.2 For example, the Park still maintains it tried to "screen" 
passengers with "bad backs." See Brief of Appellee at 29, 39. The injury here, however, is 
not a muscle strain or a bulged disk, but rather the crushing of the vertebral bone. Unless the 
Sports Park had a bone scan at the starting line checking bone density and composition, they 
were not "screening" anybody for such an injury. A jury could determine the Park's 
continued ignorance of the dangers of the ride, the causes of the risk, and the inadequacy of 
its procedures in the face of recurring injury is grossly negligent. 
In Currid v. DeKalb State Court Probation Dept, 618 S.E.2d 621 (Ga.App. 2005), 
the court of appeals reversed summary judgment by finding sufficient evidence of gross 
negligence. There, defendant had Currid performing community service on the back of a 
garbage truck when he slipped and fell to his death. There was evidence defendant had given 
Currid a pair of gloves to use and had provided him the same training received by regular 
employees. This was evidence ofsome care on the part of the defendant, but did not preclude 
a finding of gross negligence. Plaintiffs estate produced evidence Currid was not given 
2
 The Sports Park argued Mr. Pearce's listing of the Park's duties towards him was 
merely an attempt to "hedge [his] bets." See Brief of Appellee at 39. Whatever the connotation, 
Mr. Pearce was required to set forth the Park's duties: "Any analysis of a tort claim, then, begins 
with an inquiry into the existence and scope of the duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant." 
Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, Ifll; 143P.3d283. 
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safety shoes which would have provided better traction, and he should not have been on the 
truck while it exceeded 10 mph on a busy roadway. The court ruled a jury must decide 
whether this evidence constituted negligence or gross negligence. "When facts alleged as 
constituting gross negligence are such that there is room for difference of opinion between 
reasonable people as to whether or not negligence can be inferred, and if so whether in what 
degree the negligence amounts to gross negligence, the right to draw the inference is within 
the exclusive province of the jury." Id. at 626. 
In contrast to Currid, the Sports Park argues the court could only look at "the facts as 
admitted by defendant" to determine gross negligence. See Brief of Appellee at 43. Again, 
the Park argues all evidence produced by Mr. Pearce is irrelevant in the face of the Park's 
evidence it exercised some care. This is not the law in Utah. Rather, the Sports Park's gross 
negligence must be submitted to a jury. 
III. WHERE A PROVIDER OF A RECREATIONAL ACTIVITY KNOWS, 
OR SHOULD KNOW, OF A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF SERIOUS 
INJURY WHICH IS NOT AN OBVIOUS OR INHERENT RISK OF 
THE ACTIVITY, THE PROVIDER CANNOT CONTRACT AROUND 
THE RISK UNLESS MEANINGFULLY DISCLOSED AND ASSUMED 
A pre-accident exculpatory agreement is unconscionable where the provider knows 
of the substantial risk of serious injury from a danger unknown to the participants and makes 
no effort to meaningfully disclose the danger. Here, bobsled participants placed in the fourth 
seat were at a greatly increased risk of serious spinal injury. This risk was further increased 
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by the Sports Park's instruction to fourth seat riders to sit away from the third rider and arch 
their back forward to grasp the handles on the sled. 
Mr. Pearce provided evidence that 1 out of every 266 riders suffered spinal injury. 
Even if we ignore the evidence these injuries took place in the fourth position, the Sports 
Park knew, or should have known by analyzing its own incident rates, that patrons were 
exposed to a substantial risk of serious danger. 
The Park argues this was an obvious, inherent risk. The Park states Mr. Pearce "knew 
he would be rocketing down a [sic] icy, curvy track at 80 miles an hour and experiencing 
gravitational pressures of up to 5 times his own body weight." See Brief of Appellee at 26. 
From this information, the Park concludes it is "difficult to comprehend" that a patron should 
not expect his vertabrae to be crushed by G forces on even routine rides. Id. 
The Sports Park offered no evidence to support its conclusion riders should have 
expected to have their backs broken even on a routine run. The evidence, in fact, is to the 
contrary. Mr. Pearce testified he never understood his back could be broken on a routine 
ride. (TR 131). Dr. Paul France similarly opined the dangers of the fourth seat "are not 
inherently obvious to a normal rider." (Appx. 42) Here, Mr. Pearce could anticipate injury 
from a collision, tip over or other incident, but there was no reason for Mr. Pearce to expect 
injury simply from riding the bobsled on a routine run. 
Furthermore, the Sports Park used a modified sled and improperly instructed patrons 
in such a way as to increase their exposure to spinal injury in the fourth seat. (TR 132) The 
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risk of the fourth seat could have been alleviated by proper instruction and positioning, or 
even eliminated altogether by riding without a fourth passenger or using a professional 
brakeman. (TR 133) Therefore, serious spinal injury from even routine rides was not an 
obvious or inherent risk. 
As for the third prong, the Sports Park did not meaningfully disclose the risk. The 
Park argues it warned Mr. Pearce he could suffer severe personal injury or even death. See 
Brief of Appellee at 22. Anything more specific would require "a pages-long laundry list of 
hypothetical scenarios." Id. at 27, fn. 7. The problem with this argument is spinal injury in 
the fourth seat was not hypothetical, but rather statistically probable. Hypothetical injuries 
do not need to be disclosed. But once the provider knows or should know of the substantial 
risk of serious injury, he must disclose it. 
Professor David Horton, in his article Extreme Sports and Assumption of Risk: a 
Blueprint, 38 U.S.F.L.Rev. 599 (2004), made disclosure the key to offering a sport such as 
bobsledding to the public. Professor Horton opined disclosure of injury rates is the "bare 
minimum." Id. at 648. Only through disclosure can a patron be deemed to willingly accept 
the risks of the ride. "A fully-informed plaintiffs decision to engage in an extreme sport 
indicates that, for him, the benefits of the activity outweigh its risks. Warnings would thus 
allow businesses to cater only to those people who find such activities to be reasonable. By 
limiting the availability of a risky activity only to those who truly prefer to face its dangers, 
defendant businesses would ensure that they too are operating [reasonably]." Id. at 607. 
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Here, Mr. Pearce may have chosen not to ride; he may have chosen to ride in only the 
second or third seats; or he may have chosen to ride in fourth seat despite the increased 
dangers and risk. The point is he would have made the decision. Yet, in this case, he could 
not make the decision because he was never given the relevant information. Accordingly, 
the Park's release should be deemed unconscionable. 
The Sports Park argues Mr. Pearce's construct does not allow a provider to release his 
own negligence. See Brief of Appellee at 29. This is true in the case of substantial risks of 
serious injury caused by non-obvious, non-inherent risks. Where the patron does not know 
of the risk, he or she cannot make any meaningful decision regarding engaging in the 
activity. Likewise, where no meaningful decision is possible, it cannot be said there was a 
meeting of the minds on an exculpatory agreement in favor of the provider. 
For example, in Turnbough v. Ladner, 754 So.2d 467 (Miss. 1999), the Mississippi 
Supreme Court rejected an exculpatory agreement where there was no meeting of the minds. 
As here, the agreement stated the patron assumed the risks of scuba diving and, at the end 
of the release, stated he released the defendant for all claims " . . . as a result of the negligence 
of any party . . . " The Court found the plaintiff assumed the inherent risks of scuba diving, 
but "it does not necessarily follow that he, a student, intended to waive his right to recover 
from Ladner for failing to follow even the most basic industry safety standards." Id. at 469. 
The Court further found, "[sjurely it cannot be said from the language of the agreement that 
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Turnbough intended to accept any heightened exposure to injury caused by the malfeasance 
of an expert instructor." Id. at 470. 
In Harsh v. Lorain Co. Speedway, Inc., 675 N.E.2d 885 (Ohio App. 1996), a meeting 
of the minds was also critical. There, defendant's release, waiver of liability, assumption of 
the risk, and indemnity and hold-harmless agreement was left for the jury because "factual 
questions exist as to whether appellant could knowingly assume the risk of injury where the 
inadequacy of the guardrail in front of the embankment may have been known to appellees 
but not communicated to appellant." Likewise, in Larsen v. Vic Tanney Int% 474 N.E.2d 
729 (111. App. 1984), the Illinois court ruled, "[a] plaintiffs decision to assume the risk of 
injury resulting from a defendant's conduct attains efficacy only in a context in which the 
plaintiff may foresee the range of possible dangers to which he subjects himself, thus 
enabling the plaintiff to minimize the risk by altering his conduct in order to employ a 
proportionately higher degree of caution." Id. at 732. 
Here, Mr. Pearce assumed the inherent risks of bobsledding. In deciding to ride the 
bobsled he considered the risks of collision, tipping over, or falling out of the bobsled and 
determined the ride was worth that risk. He did not, and could not, decide the ride was worth 
a significant chance of spinal injury on even routine runs because that was not disclosed. He 
did not, and could not, decide he would ride in the fourth seat despite its greatly increased 
risk of injury because it was not disclosed. He did not, and could not, decide to position 
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himself in a manner that substantially increased his risk of injury because it was not 
disclosed. 
Mr. Pearce and the Sports Park could have no meeting of the minds where the 
substantial risk of serious injury from a non-inherent risk was never meaningfully disclosed. 
Enforcement of such an agreement in the absence of meaningful disclosure is 
unconscionable. 
IV. MEANINGFUL DISCLOSURE OF KNOWN RISKS IS CONSISTENT 
WITH UTAH LAW 
The meaningful disclosure of known risks is not new to Utah law. As set forth in Mr. 
Pearce's initial brief, Utah places the duty on landowners and service providers to discover 
and eliminate or warn of the dangers on their land or products. Utah similarly requires 
service providers to protect patrons from risk and not increase the danger of activity. Here, 
the Sports Park desires, by contract, to abdicate its common-law duties and shift the burden 
of all risks to patrons. Utah contract law could only allow such a shift where the risks are 
meaningfully disclosed allowing the patron to assess the risks and the terms of the contract. 
Resource Mgmt Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1043 (Utah 
1985)(fmding disclosure and assessment of risks intrinsic in process of contracting). Mr. 
Pearce's proposed construct brings nothing of the new or novel to Utah law, but rather 
incorporates it.3 
3
 The Sports Park argues only the legislature could require meaningful disclosure in 
exculpatory agreements. See Brief of Appellee at 30. This Court recently rejected this end-
around. "Typically, courts cede authority over matters of policy to the political branches of 
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Mr. Pearce's proposed construct also does not offend the policies set forth in TunkI 
v. Regents of Univ. of California, 383 P.2d 441, 445 (1963). Under TunkI, exculpatory 
agreements in the arena of essential public services are unenforceable. However, it does not 
follow that agreements for recreational services are automatically enforceable. 
Here, the circumstances surrounding the Park's suspect exculpatory agreement contain 
the earmarks of unenforceability mentioned in TunkL The Park offered the bobsled ride to 
the general public, with a decisive bargaining advantage allowing it to require a take-it-or-
leave-it adhesion contract, and maintaining all control over the ride and patrons. Even if not 
deemed a public service, the Park's exculpatory agreement is still unenforceable because 
there was no meaningful disclosure of the risks of the ride to Mr. Pearce. 
Yet, it cannot be conceded the Sports Park was not engaged in a public service. 
Though the bobsled ride is not a matter of practical necessity for members of the public, there 
are important distinctions between the Park's operations and the homebuilder the Sports Park 
relies upon fromRuss v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901 (Ut.App. 1995). The bobsled 
track was designed, built and maintained for several years by public funds. See Brief of 
Appellee at 3. It is open to the public in response to that funding, as an Olympic "legacy" 
venue. Id. at 4. Unlike a construction site, the Sports Park held itself out as a fun, 
entertaining, exhilarating "ride of a lifetime" for anyone over 16 years of age. (Appx. 47) 
government. When policy considerations bear on a subject lodged firmly within the court's 
sphere, like the common law, it is entirely appropriate for the court to make the policy judgments 
necessary to get the law right." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, f 20; 143 P.3d 283. 
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As stated in Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795,799 (Vt. 1995), "when a substantial number 
of such sales take place as a result of the seller's general invitation to the public to utilize the 
facilities and services in question, a legitimate public interest arises." The Sports Park's role 
in providing public recreational activities highlights its need to meaningfully disclose the 
risks of such activities. 
V. THE SPORTS PARK'S USER AGREEMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE 
AS WRITTEN 
The Sports Park's User Agreement is ambiguous and, thus, unenforceable as written. 
The Sports Park argues Part Fs definition of inherent risks included negligence such as the 
failure to follow safety procedures or defects in the facilities. Indeed, Part I included the risk 
of "failure to follow safety procedures, or to stay within ability or control." But this simply 
lends itself to the reasonable interpretation it referred to Mr. Pearce's conduct, not the Park's, 
and thus had no bearing on the Park's negligence. 
Part I continued with the risk of "limits or defects in the Sports Facilities." The Park 
argues this clause contractually altered Utah's accepted definition of inherent risks by 
including therein defects in the facilities which could be alleviated or eliminated. See e.g. 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1046-47 (Utah 1991)(defining inherent risks 
as hazards that cannot be eliminated by the exercise of ordinary care); White v. Deseelhorst, 
879 P.2d 1371, 1375 (Utah 1994)(same). Instead of bringing clarity to Part I, the Park's 
definition adds to the patron's confusion by stating they assume only inherent risks and then 
changing the definition of that term, mid-clause, to include negligence. Yet, Utah law will 
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not imply the Sports Park meant to include its own negligence in Part I. Bishop v. Gentec, 
Inc., 2002 UT 36, \ 19. Therefore, Mr. Pearce did not assume the risk of the Park's 
negligence under Part I. 
Not to worry, the Park argues, any confusion in Part I was rectified in Part III where 
Mr. Pearce purportedly released "any and all liability, claims, demands, and causes of action 
whatsoever . . . whether caused by the negligence of releasees or otherwise." See Brief of 
Appellee at 22. This quote from the Park uses ellipses to skip over a total of thirty-five (35) 
words in Part Ill's run-on sentence. Indeed the Park, in an effort to make sense of Part III, 
cannot quote it without resorting to ellipses. Id. at 21, 22. 
Strictly construed, even were Part III comprehensible, it ambiguously releases claims 
for a risk, i.e. the Park's negligence, which was not assumed in Part I. Due to this ambiguity, 
a jury could determine the Park's exculpatory contract is not enforceable against Mr. Pearce. 
DATED t h i s l A day of July, 2007. 
SILVESTER & CONROY, L.C. 
%-Se 
FRED R. SILVESTER 
SPENCER C. SIEBERS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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